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The way we think, understand, and speak about gender is ​changing​. In 2019, more people 
than ever are identifying as nonbinary or gender fluid. Feminism as theory and as political 
practice has long assumed the subject of ‘women’ as its primary and ​essential​ subject, but the 
issues and subjects that feminism speaks for are not necessarily self-identified or even​ percieved 
as ‘women.’ Through analyzing influential feminist works and thinkers, I aim to elucidate the 
identitarian comitment of canonical feminsm, and to offer an alternative to the politics of 
feminism as ​always ​grounded in the subject of ‘women.’ My thesis develops four central 
approaches for a feminist politics that is attentive to a plurality of subjects: 1) examining the 
connective tissue​ of emotions and experiences to better grapple with how subjects are 
constructed, 2) ​opening ​the category of ‘women’ to resignification and new associations, 3) 
decentralizing ‘women’ as the ​primary​ and ​sole​ subject of feminsim, and 4) taking a 




The debate on what constitutes gender, what constitutes​ woman​, is implicitly important 
for feminism, as feminism has historically relied on, and been associated with, the 
gendered-subject of women. Theories differ widely across feminist discourse about how to 
encapsulate the experiences of women who are oppressed by patriarchal power on a sexual or 
gender basis, but what has also ranged and transformed over time is feminism’s definition of 
‘women’ as the subject of its politics. Much of feminist theory relies on being able to use the 
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word ‘woman’ as the grounding subject connoting an identifiable social location within society, 
and within patriarchy. To discuss the injustices that occur systematically against women, 
feminism has historically required a definitive description of ‘women,’ in order to indicate ​who 
these injustices occur onto.​ ​For feminist politics to fight for the emancipation of subordinated 
subjects, must feminism be grounded in a defined and fixed category of identification ​of women​? 
If the outlines and definition of the female subject are undecidable, “how can we ground a 
feminist politics that deconstructs the female subject?” (Alcoff 1988, p. 419). In “The Identity 
Crisis in Feminist Theory,” Linda Alcoff quotes Biddy Martin, arguing that absolving the 
category of woman due to an “abstract theoretical correctness… could make the question of 
women's oppression obsolete," (Alcoff 1988, p. 419). How can feminist politics understand 
gender as deconstructed while still taking up the question of women’s oppression? What would a 
feminist politics that isn’t grounded in the subject of ‘women’ look like? 
Now more than ever, people are more likely to reject gender binaries, or to identify as 
genderqueer. The increasing fluidity of gender identities has been taken up both socially and 
legally by means of de-essentializing gender given at birth, and relocating gender as something 
performative, unfixed, and grounded in self-identification. The question of how feminism can 
proceed without centering the subject of women is particularly relevant in 2019, when ‘women’ 
as a category is socially expanding to encapsulate more diverse bodies and experiences. The 
identity of ‘woman’ is also resisted in some cases, by people who are subject to being socially 
categorized as a ‘woman’ due to their embodiment or expression of cultural norms historically 
associated with ‘women.’ Political movements around reproductive control, gender 
discrimination, and bodily autonomy are movements that can no longer be solely identified as 
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“women’s movements” alone, because it is not only women who have a personal stake in these 
movements. Gender-fluid people, nonbinary people, trans people, people whose lives are shaped 
by sexual subordination, people who are denied bodily autonomy: these are groups who are 
excluded from feminism when ‘women’ are assumed to be the primary subject of feminist 
movements.  
 GLAAD’s “Accelerating Acceptance 2017” survey stated that “acceptance of LGBTQ 
people has reached historic levels, particularly among Millennials.” The survey found that “12% 
of Millennials identify as transgender or gender nonconforming, meaning they do not identify 
with the sex they were assigned at birth or their gender expression is different from conventional 
expectations of masculinity and femininity,” (Accelerating Acceptance 2017, p. 3). The 
revolution of genderqueer-ness is likely due to widespread “increased cultural understanding and 
acceptance,” as well as the explosion of internet communities, new technologies, and 
post-structural thought. The increasing social validity of identifying as genderqueer is a 
cumulative movement, building off of the increasing popularity and access to genderqueer 
representation in the media and public sphere. Because of all this progress in moving away from 
the gender binary, “young people are now more likely to openly identify as LGBTQ while also 
rejecting traditional labels and seeing the world in terms that are beyond a binary,” (Accelerating 
Acceptance 2017, p. 7).  
We have developed new ways to think and speak about gender, which has been liberatory 
in many ways for people who experience gender dysphoria, for people who are transgender, and 
for people who do not identify within the man/woman binary of gender. Though this 
gender-identity politics has been emancipatory and invaluable, gender fluidity also complicates 
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the historical project of feminism, which has relied on a knowable, fixed, and locatable subject of 
‘women.’ The concept of ‘woman’ has become a problem for feminist discourse due to 
disagreements on how the term can, or should, be applied and defined in varying sociocultural 
contexts. With the fluidity of gender making null the fixed boundaries of women’s subjectivity, 
there is a threat to how a political movement could even discuss the plight of women, as 
deconstruction “threatens to dissipate us and our projects as it… disintegrates the coherence of 
women as a collective subject,” (Brown 1995, p. 39). Vital voices ​have been​ and ​are​ excluded 
from feminism due to the rigid fixity of defining women and women’s experiences as the 
primary and essential subjects of feminism. How can feminism proceed with a politics capable of 
acknowledging the multiplicity of women’s needs, but also how these needs are not specific to 
women alone? How can feminist politics still engage in resisting the oppression of women, when 
grounding feminist politics in the fixed subject of ‘woman’ produces factionalization, 
Eurocentrism, and wound culture, instead of a politics of solidarity? I argue for a feminist 
politics of emotion, a feminist politics that both decentralizes and opens the subject of ‘women,’ 
and a feminist politics of deconstruction. These four approaches are integral for a feminist 
politics capabale of taking up gender discrimination in a moment where gender is more fluid 
than it has ever been. 
 
Part I 
Rethinking Feminism in a Gender Nonconforming Age  
The understanding of “women” as the subject of feminism has been a conceptual norm 
for many academics and persons for much of the 20th century. To many thinkers, the “defining 
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feature of feminist theories has been their grounding in women’s experience,” (Hunter 1996, p. 
135). The conceptualization of a “women's experience” has been thought to be “a basis for 
feminist politics,” a distinctive sense of women’s liberation being ​the​, or at least the primary, 
goal of feminist movements (Hunter 1996, p. 135). It is often assumed that women are the 
primary subject of feminism, but that feminism may ​also​ include issues of race, sexuality, and/or 
class. Thus, “women” are often the assumptive subject of feminist works, unless explicitly stated 
otherwise, based for many off the understanding that “women are usually the subject of feminist 
history,” (Hunter 1996, p. 135). Grounding feminist analyses around a conceptual framework of 
the liberation of ‘women’ fails to account for how women are configured in relation to social 
factors beyond the realm of gender.  
Exploring how ‘women’ have been understood and articulated as a category that 
encapsulates a myriad of persons with shared attributes, helps us understand the historical 
connective tissue of feminist theory and politics. Feminism has deployed and relied on the 
identity of ‘women’ as the connective tissue that ​holds together ​the category of feminist theory. 
By “connective tissue,” I mean what compels people to join in solidarity and coalitional 
resistance, the externally recognized and acknowledged instrumental qualities generated between 
people that stimulate feelings of trust, support, and a cultivated knowledge of tethered 
experiences and hopes. Defining who ‘women’ are has been inextricably linked to defining the 
politics and aspirations of feminism; feminist politics shift depending on the lived experiences 
and cultural effects it is attentive to.  
I will explore how feminist discourse has attempted to describe the category of ‘women,’ 
or to locate the factors that ​make someone​ a woman. I explore essentialism in two veins; 
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biological essentialism, and experiential essentialism. Essentialism is the understanding that “a 
collection of individuals constitutes a kind that is defined by a common and unique property (or 
properties),” (Witt 2011, p. 5). Biological essentialism seeks to establish either reproductive or 
anatomical properties as what qualifies an individual as a woman. Experiential essentialism 
seeks to establish the properties of ‘women’ by the social experiences of women. I will discuss 
work by theorists such as Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, who locate the shared 
characteristic of all women as occupying subordinated positionalities due to their gendered 
and/or sexed bodies. Exploring gender essentialism is crucial to understanding how feminist 
politics in our current moment are​ inhibited​ by relying and insisting on a fixed subject (women) 
in order to ground feminist politics. 
I will discuss the views of ‘cultural feminism,’ a term borrowed from Linda Alcoff, 
which says women have a shared ‘essence,’ which is grounded in either reproductive capacities 
or social behaviors. This is a mode of experiential essentialism, but it has ties to biological 
essentialism in that this ‘essence’ is rooted in having a female body. I explore cultural feminism 
in order to locate the professed ‘essence’ of women, where cultural feminism fails to 
acknowledge the constructed character of feminized subjects, and also where cultural feminism 
actually reinforces the concept of a natural, inherent gender identity, which serves to position 
women in accordance to the ideals of who ‘women’ are, or should be, notions of ‘women’ that 
are enforced and maintained by patriarchal structures of dominance. Though cultural feminism 
asserts a type of reclamation politics by hoping to destigmatize values that have been historically 
been associated with women, (i.e. caregiving, emotional intelligence, nurturing), this method of 
experiential essentialism fails to imagine a conception of ‘woman,’ nor a subject of feminism, 
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that is not solely produced and defined by ​the effects​ of patriarchal power, which regulates, 
categorizes, and associates ‘women’ with specific virtues in order to claim an inevitable and 
natural division of social and political power due to gender difference. 
Some have argued that feminist politics cannot survive without a claim to an interpretable 
subject, like theorist Linda Alcoff who argues that “the concept of woman is a problem” for 
feminists and feminist ideology alike, because “the concept and category of woman is the 
necessary point of departure for any feminist theory and feminist politics,” yet the question of 
what defines women has either been assumed, or set aside (Alcoff 1988, p. 405). I argue that the 
category of ‘women’ is not the necessary point of departure for feminist politics or feminist 
theory, but rather that the category of ‘women’ should be ​taken up​ by feminist theorists as a 
contestable, shifting, and always re-situated identity. I also argue that using the identity category 
of ‘women’ to ground a politics is less useful than a politics grounded in solidarity, a politics of 
resistance, of both sharing and witnessing, of relation​ between​ and ​among​ identities. 
What could feminism become if we allowed “the concept of woman” to be a rich arena 
for understanding how gender functions, instead of the problem that Linda Alcoff suggests it is? 
I argue it is important for feminist theory to retain the grasp on the role of identity in analyses of 
the present, but I also assert that the deconstruction of ‘women’ offered by post-structuralist 
feminst theory is not necessarily an attempt to ‘do away’ with analyzing the tangible and 
emotional affects of identification. I will move to discuss the work of post-structural feminist 
theories from Judith Butler and Denise Riley in order to examine​ the constructive nature and 
performativity of gender, creating a deeper understanding the temporality​, location, and 
embodiment of being a woman that is de-essentialized from both the body, and from any notion 
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of an internal or naturalized gender ‘essence.’ Grappling with the deconstructed subject of 
‘woman’ has positive consequences for feminism, of understanding and unpacking the role of 
social and political institutions in determining our identities.  
Beyond deconstructing the identity of ‘woman,’ feminism would benefit from 
distinguishing itself from ​a politics of identity​. Identity politics are insufficient as a political 
praxis, because this politics fails to recognize that the sameness or overlap of identities ​does not 
beget a shared commitment to a political movement or ideology. Feminism is suffering an 
identity crisis, but this crisis will birth new ways of being in the world, new commonalities, new 
communities, new ways of connection that are built around viewpoints, political desires, and the 
connective tissues of experience and emotion. 
My Approach 
I will analyze influential feminist theories that have attempted to resolve the debate on 
who ‘women’ are, and thus position a feminist politics that is grounded in either the biological 
essentialism of women, or the experiential essentialism of women. It is important to think about 
how feminists have thought about these debates around ‘identity’ in order to understand our 
contemporary moment. The question of ‘women’ has been taken up before, and it is important to 
understand how feminist politics have been situated in accordance to these definitions, because 
feminist politics is​ currently situated​ due to work of these canonical feminists, among others.  
Identities are important to people: they are ​meaningful​. While this meaning is applied, as 
opposed to inherent, identities have a profound impact on people’s lived experiences, how we 
make sense of our place in the world, and how we relate to each other. Though identity is 
prescriptive, constructed, and culturally contingent, identity also is a meaningful tool to 
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understand ​how we are produced as subjects​, a production that is constant, never complete, and 
always embedded in how we make sense of ourselves. Feminism should retain the investment of 
grappling with how identities are produced, and how they produce us. To investigate how a 
feminist politics can take up gender fluidity is imperative to feminism’s emancipatory potential, 
and is an essential task for feminism’s affective political impact.  
I hope to elucidate the relentless identitarian commitment of feminist theory of the past, 
because I hope to profess a feminism that is not restricted to ‘women’ as its subject. The task of 
defining ‘women’ cannot and should not be closed. Feminism cannot proceed as a politics of 
identity, nor a politics grounded in the subject of ‘woman.’ This ground is unstable, this ground 
is a shape-shifter, this ground is invested in its own subordination, this ground is not universal, 
this ground cannot speak, alone, for a politics of resistance. Feminism musn’t necessitate 
boundaries between sexed and gendered categories in order to be a political movement that 
organizes in resistance against the subordination of feminized subjects, of vulnerable subjects, of 
subordinated subjects. 
In this thesis, I will be unpacking four central approaches for contemporary feminism in a 
society of increasing gender fluidity: a renewed understanding of connective tissues and how the 
politics of emotion construct our experiences and identities; opening the subject of ‘women’ to 
resignification and qualities; decentralizing the subject of ‘women’ within feminist politics to 
focus instead on contingent feminisms with a plurality of subjects; an investment in feminist 
consciousness; and a turn to movements over identity to ground feminist politics. 
Connective Tissues of Emotion and Experience 
9 
Gwen Frost 
I hope to understand how feminist politics can operate from a more multivariable 
conception of woman​ness​. I hope to prove that there are connective tissues among women that 
can serve as a platform for feminism, tissues that avoid exclusionary requirements of biology or 
innate essence. These connective tissues that produce group consciousness can be located by 
looking at Sara Ahmed’s work of feminist constructive nature through how emotions move 
through, and form, the subject of ‘women.’ In​ The Cultural Politics of Emotion​, Ahmed explores 
how emotions circulate in the form of economies, sticking and becoming signifiers of specific 
subjects, as well as bonding and providing a basis for solidarity on commonly shared grounds. 
How women are read as ‘emotional’ in some contexts provides an interesting basis for discussing 
the role that emotions play in how we make sense of our own identities, and the identities of 
others. Ahmed’s work professes a category of women to be ​emotionally constructed​, both in how 
people self-identify as women, and in how one perceives or locates an ‘other’ as a woman. 
Opening the Category of ‘Women’ to Resignification 
I argue for a feminist politics that works to destabilize the category of ‘women’ by 
opening that identity up to resignification, varied associations, and a plurality of bodies. 
Allowing the category of ‘women’ to be up for debate, always, serves to open up feminism to a 
plurality of subordinated subjects. Feminism should allow the term of ‘women’ to remain open, 
to never be fixed in relation to a subordinated status, nor an anatomical makeup.  
Decentralizing the Subject: A Focus and Endorsement of Contingent Feminisms 
If any assumed universal traits of women are racist, classist, and heteronormative, is there 
a salvageable category of ‘women’ to carry with us into future theorizing if we are also fighting 
for to strip feminism of its white supremacy, heteronormativity, and disregard for how women’s 
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experiences vary across socioeconomic position and cultural location? It seems that “in many 
contexts, 'women' are too heterogeneous to be treated as a unitary group,” (Hunter 1996, 156). 
The task of mitigating our discourse to avoid totalizing any theory is a positive trajectory for 
intersectional feminism. Perhaps there should be no ‘feminism,’ only ​feminisms​, a network of 
alliances to alleviate subordination that occurs through various apparatuses on our gendered and 
sexed beings. Resistance to patriarchal oppression will be best enacted when actual connective 
tissues of subordinated femininity are elucidated, and subjected to constant re-phrasing and 
conceptualizing.  
Feminist Consciousness: A Turn to Movements Over Identity  
 I argue that the discussions on deconstructing the subject of ‘women’ are important for 
feminism, but I also intervene to describe a plurality of connectivities among and around women 
that offer a feminist group-consciousness with which to connect, weave, and ground a feminist 
politics on the basis of a deeper understanding of how subordinated subjects are constructed and 
exist in the world. Feminism needs tethering, not grounding, to be focused not through a fixed 
subject, but to be focused on collectives of emotion, material ties, and the deconstruction of 
historical prefigurements of identity. The language of ‘grounding’ insinuates a stabilization,  or a 
fixed point of tangible reference. Feminism should adopt a practice that is not grounded, but 
tethered​, as tethered requires multiple points of reference at differing locations. In order to open 
the subject of feminism, I want to review how the subject has been closed in canonical feminist 





Literature Review: Gender Essentialisms  
The reason that I am addressing essentialism is to understand how women have 
problematically been defined in a way that limits political possibilities for women, and limits the 
possibilities for feminist politics. I will be looking at biological gender essentialism and 
experiential gender essentialism to understand how feminist theory has attempted to construct 
women, and ​what kind of feminist politics​ arise from these constructions. 
Biological essentialism   
Biological essentialism is the oldest school of thought in understanding gender, and is 
thus the most instantiated, ingrained, and widely spread theory of how gender ​works​. Biological 
essentialism is the theory that our biology (the physical body) is a reliable determinator or 
explanation for how people are socially identified and understood; it is the theory that individuals 
have a baseline of physical construction that results in how they behave, are treated, and where 
they are located within society. Biological ​gender​ essentialism argues that behavioral and social 
differences, gender roles, and differing social locations between genders are all caused by the 
inherent, material, and pre-political characteristics of their bodies. Biological gender essentialism 
also promotes a cisgender universalism of “women”; it is the theory that one’s biology dictates 
one’s gender, with a correspondence of male sex organs to “man,” and female sex organs to 
“woman.”  
The social condition of being a woman thus originates with having female anatomy, and 
women are oppressed in social, political, and personal sphere​ through ​their bodies; subordination 




One of the most essential feminist texts that relies on biological essentialism is Adrienne 
Rich’s “Of Woman Born.” For Rich, the role of “the mother” is a connective tissue among all 
women, thus grounding her feminist politics in a material and biological conception of ‘women.’ 
Rich relies on an implicitly-cisgendered woman as a subject, which enables her to show how 
women with female anatomy across cultures interact differently to the two meanings of 
motherhood she defines: first, “​potential relationship​ of any woman to her powers of 
reproduction” and second, the ​institution​ “which aims at ensuring that that potential - and all 
women - shall remain under male control,” (Rich 1997, p. 13). Thus, biological potential to 
reproduce as a mother is a tool utilized and controlled by patriarchal supremacy, configuring 
women’s oppression by men, at least in part, as due to bodily and reproductive possibility.  
Sprung from essentialism have come universal claims of joint, reproductive sufferings 
due to woman’s “female” anatomy, a female anatomy that shapes and dictates the lives of 
women, as “the female generative organs… have become a prime target of patriarchal 
technology,” (Rich 1997, p. 127). Biological reproduction is configured by Rich as the material 
means with which women are controlled, through systemic and societal investments in the 
institution of motherhood. Rich argues that the womb has historically been “made into a source 
of powerlessness” for the purposes of “transfiguring and enslaving woman,” (Rich 1997, p. 68).  
The material presence of the womb is what subjects a woman to powerlessness ​as​ a 
woman. Rich points to de Beauvoir’s argument that “It was as Mother that woman was fearsome; 
it is in maternity that she must be transfigured and enslaved,” (de Beauvoir 1952, p. 171). Both 
authors localize women’s subordination in how social, political, and medical institutions seek to 
exclude, transfigure, and enslave women ​by proxy of their reproductive and biological 
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capacities. ​Rich says that if “rape has been terrorism, then motherhood has been penal 
servitude,” (Rich 1997, p. 14). This analogy describes how the female body is the site, symbol, 
and receptacle of women’s oppression. As women are oppressed, they are oppressed through 
their lack of sovereignty over their own reproduction, which also denies women sovereignty of 
their bodies and lives.  
This biological gender essentialism offers a navigable feminist politics for the 
emancipation of women. By defining women within their biological makeup, feminist politics 
thus are oriented towards a politics of investment in women’s bodily sovereignty, mobility, and 
access to public and political spaces, and such a politics is reactive to barriers that restrict 
women’s bodies. The institution of motherhood hardly offers an entirely comprehensive site for 
women’s subordination, but it is one of the threads that traverses the cluster of gender: Some 
women are oppressed in response to their reproductive capacities, but other women are 
oppressed because of their deviations from the norms of motherhood, or for having male sex 
organs while identifying as female.  
Creating a politics around anatomy further subjects women to being associated with and 
delimited to their anatomy. It is important to de-hierarchize reproductive rights within feminist 
politics, because reproductive rights are not a coherent or universal signifier of women’s 
struggle, nor of the feminist struggle. Patriarchal power operates not just on women’s delegation 
to the role of mother, but also to the role of wife, daughter, sex object, woman in the workforce, 
etc. The overemphasis on the role that motherhood plays in women’s oppression severely 
underestimates the reach of patriarchal power, which extends to control and oppress women 
further beyond their reproductive capacity. Just as feminist political thinkers like Rich are 
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resisting biological essentialism in arguing that gender subordination is not a natural or inherent 
consequence of gender difference, they also ​rely​ on the premise that gender difference is 
essential, inherent and fixed due to biological difference. A conception of women as tied to their 
biology, and therefore their reproductive capacity, falters as a functional ground for feminist 
politics because this conception ​refuses to articulate women outside of their anatomical 
existence​. Not all women have uteri, not all women are able to reproduce, and a portion of the 
people who possess the ability to give birth are not women. Simply, not all women experience 
reproductive subordination, and many people who do are not women. Assuming that women are 
oppressed because of their association with motherhood is an incomplete picture of how women 
are subordinated by the multifacets of patriarchal power, and this analysis overemphasizes 
reproduction both in the lives of women, and as a determining factor of womanhood. A majority 
of women in the world have reproductive potential and are thus controlled and subordinated 
through patriarchal control of this capacity, which I argue can be maintained as ​a, ​but not ​the 
connective tissue between women and Mothers, because though these identities are at times 
concurrently embodied, ​neither category necessitates the other.​ Resistance to the harmful 
institutionalization of motherhood, and how mothers are oppressed and subordinated is an 
important project for feminism, but it is surely not ​the grounds​ for feminism. Contesting and 
promoting women’s authority and domain as mothers is an important strand of feminist praxis, 
but this tissue is connective among a plurality of bodies, and it is not connective for all women.  
 In “A Note on Anger,” Marilyn Frye importantly notes that the extension of women’s 
ability to advocate justice, anger, and autonomy within the role of the mother “represents only a 
small shift in the concept of Woman. Historically and logically it was an extension of our right to 
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mother,” (Frye 1983, p. 92). To interrogate the right of the mother would be to assault one of the 
few roles in which women are given and ​denied​ sovereignty in patriarchal society, but it is not 
within these bounds exclusively that feminist politics should advocate for sovereignty of women. 
Articulating women’s rights ​as​ mothers rights re-instantiates women’s inevitable and assigned 
role as a caretaker, nurturer, and conserver. A reproductive feminist politics limits feminist 
politics that do not speak from the socially-accepted position of ‘woman as mother.’ Biological 
gender essentialism is a limited and contradictory model for identifying the subject of feminism, 
because centralizing the discussion of ‘women’s rights ​as​ mothers’ is limited to pre-accepted and 
pre-stratified norms of how women should be, and who women are. 
 
Experiential Essentialism 
Experiential gender essentialism defines women not in their biology, but in their social 
experience of subordination under patriarchy, where women’s subjectivity is configured by men 
and patriarchal power. I turn to Catharine MacKinnon in order to explain experiential 
essentialism, where MacKinnon “locates women's essence in the social realm. For her, the 
defining fact about women is that they are socially subordinated, primarily through the 
appropriation of their sexuality.” (Hunter 1996, p. 137). In the system of patriarchy, ‘women’ are 
wholly constructed by their “collective social history of disempowerment, exploitation and 
subordination extending to the present,” (MacKinnon 1991, p. 15). MacKinnon emphasizes the 
distinct social experience of women as a ground for the group consciousness of women. For 
MacKinnon, being treated ​as a woman​ is “to refer to this diverse and pervasive concrete material 
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reality of social meanings and practices,” and “to be disadvantaged in these ways incident to 
being socially assigned to the female sex,” (MacKinnon 1991, p. 15-16). 
MacKinnon’s notion of a “social experience” that aligns individuals into the category of 
women relies on a notion of socially distinguishable gender cues, of first being able to ​interpret 
someone as a woman in order to ​treat ​them as a woman. MacKinnon’s theory also works to draw 
large patterns of globalized patriarchal domination, which exists and acts upon women to 
different degrees depending on their positionality within social strata. Describing the treatment 
of women is “to describe the realities of women's situation,” which though cannot be 
universalized as ‘the same’ for all women, women’s situation as subordinate parallels across 
social dimensions of race and class to describe oppressions of sexual degradation, sexual 
harassment, the demeaning of feminized labor, unequal compensation as male counterparts 
within mirroring racial and economic strata, as well as dehumanization (MacKinnon 1991, p. 
15).  
Andrea Dworkin is another canonical and influential feminist thinker who utilizes 
experiential gender essentialism. In the book ​Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, 
and Equality, ​as well as in much of her other work, Dworkin too describes women as defined by 
their subordination, but she locates this subordination in the gendered violence of pornography: 
  It (Pornography) sexualizes inequality and in doing so creates discrimination as a 
sex-based practice.  
  It permeates the political condition of women in society by being the substance of our 
inequality however located-in jobs, in education, in marriage, in life.  
  It is women, kept a sexual underclass, kept available for rape and battery and incest and 
prostitution.  
  It is what we are under male domination; it is what we are for under male domination.  
  It is the heretofore hidden (from us) system of subordination that women have been told 
is just life. 
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  Under male supremacy, it is the synonym for what being a woman is, (Dworkin 1985, p. 
10). 
 
Dworkin understands pornography as a site, culmination, and manifestation of women’s 
subjectivity, implicitly built into the power structures and dynamics of the industry of 
pornography. Dworkin’s analysis of pornography is limited to pornography that has an assumed 
male viewer of the female body or of the sexual act, an assumed heterosexual-male perspective 
of power dynamics, and an assumed replication of the gender discrimination that is rampant in 
contemporary (and past) society. Dworkin also conceptualizes the creation of the subject of 
women as being formed through denigration and subordination, as “the creation of a sexual 
dynamic in which the putting-down of women, the suppression of women, and ultimately the 
brutalization of women, is what sex is taken to be,” (Dworkin 1985, p. 9). If pornography is an 
institution that creates women through dynamics of subordination, then the application of the 
subject “woman” does not necessarily need to apply only to female bodies.  
What useful material I gather from Dworkin and MacKinnon’s arguments are the 
villainization of the feminine, the collapsing of categories of the weak and overpowered with the 
category of women. Pornography is a reflection of naturalized gender dynamics, where women 
are configured as those who are dominated, exposed, and exploited. What would Dworkin’s 
analysis of pornography offer the photos of sexual and physical abuse committed by ​U.S. 
soldiers at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison? The sexualization of inequality and of power dynamics is 
not limited to female bodies or women subjects, but permeates across the bodies of prisoners, 
queer people, and non-white persons who live in white-dominated societies. Sexual 
subordination and the manipulation of bodies by dominant groups is in no way specific to the 
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identities of man and woman, but works rather as a script that can slide from context to context, 
where power differences lie. The prisoners at Abu Ghraib were abused, raped, and dehumanized, 
and many of these acts were documented and distributed. If pornography is an institution that 
causes the affects of pleasure at the witnessing of subordination, it is in no way “a synonym for 
what a woman is,” as Dworkin professes it is. Sexual subordination and abuse manifest in 
locations of pre-existing power dynamics, between prison guards and prisoners, priests and 
parish boys, men and women… To divorce sexual subordination from the ​condition of ​being a 
woman would serve feminist theory to navigate a more comprehensive and inclusive analysis of 
how sexual subordination is weaponized and deployed in pre-existing power dynamics. 
In response to the assertions of women as connected due to mutual subordination from 
masculine forces, what ​else​ are women? How are women shaped by emotions, by material 
objects, by their community and social positioning? Deploying subordination as the definitive 
marker of ‘women’ is a troubling base for feminist politics. If we reject this ontological base for 
women, we then also concede that subordination alone is not what then defines ‘women.’ 
Unified only through their designation to a subordinated group, ‘women’ would not exist if they 
didn’t occupy these subordinate positions, so configuring identity this way limits women’s 
capacity to avoid subordination ​while still remaining a woman​.  
 
The Problem with Defining Women in Terms of Subordination 
Experiential essentialism must also reconcile the political implications of designating 
“subordinate positioning” as the ontological base of women, which serves to ideologically 
position and reposition women ​as​ subordinate. For thinkers like Jacques Derrida, identifying 
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within the binary structure of gender (as a woman) does not subvert the “dichotomous hierarchy” 
essential​ to the division of genders (Alcoff 1988, p. 417). This argument is also clear in Alcoff’s 
synopsis of post-structuralist thinkers like Foucault, who rejects the investments in identity by 
“oppositional subjects,” because such investments “merely recreate and sustain the discourse of 
power,” that constructed the identities as oppositional in the first place (Alcoff 1988, p. 418).  
One of the most compelling interventions in feminist politics grounded in the subject of 
‘women’ is Wendy Brown’s essay “Wounded Attachments.” For Brown, the act of claiming 
marginalized and/or oppressed identities is problematically tethered to the structures of 
domination that seek to maintain the subordination of women and/or marginalized identities. 
This argument disrupts the premise of the experiential essentialism, specifically the essentialism 
utilized by thinkers like Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, who choose to deploy a 
feminist politics grounded in women’s identity ​as ​subordinated subjects. Women’s “wounded 
attachment” to the identity of ‘women’ is hypothesized by Brown as an ​investment ​in the 
continued subordination of women. Making a claim to an oppressed identity re-substantiates the 
subject ​as​ oppressed. In Brown’s argument, a subject making an identity-based political claim is 
susceptible to further subjugating themselves by claiming status and recognition in “categories 
such as race or gender that emerged and circulated as terms of power to enact subordination,” 
(Brown 1995, p. 55). I push Brown’s argument to further specificity, that it is the conflation of 
the injury and the identity that does the work of making this attachment wounded, rather than 
simply the identification within subordinated categories. Political action grounded in one’s claim 
to an injured identity maintains an investment in ​the very conditions that made the injury 
possible​. This produces results that contradict the feminisms emancipatory intentions. This 
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paradox requires that women find liberation not through claiming​ injury as identity,​ but rather 
through articulating a desired future based off of what is denied or absent form the present. 
Brown asks “what kind of political recognition can identity-based claims seek... that will not 
resubordinate a subject itself historically subjugated through identity, through categories such as 
race or gender that emerged and circulated as terms of power to enact subordination?” (Brown 
1995, p. 55). Brown makes this argument among a chorus of other theorists considered to be 
postmodern and/or poststructuralist feminists; Julia Kristeva, Denise Riley, Judith Butler, 
Jacques Derrida… the list goes on. These theorists argue that claims to a subjectivity of ‘woman’ 
actually​ further​ the very subordination and denigration that feminist politics hopes to alleviate. 
While I agree that articulating oneself as subordinated has different effects than articulating a 
desired future for politics, I also acknowledge the limitations of Brown’s theory of “Wounded 
Attachments,” limitations that inadequately recognize the ​difference ​between a feminist politics 
that conflates injury and identity, and a feminist politics of recognizing injuries that occur onto 
persons because of how they are located within the sociocultural matrix of identity. If feminist 
politic wants to be attentive to the experiences of oppressed peoples, experiences of injury will 
remain as an integral aspect of collective healing and grievances, and motivating a politics of 
resistance. Speaking about injury is a contestation of the conditions of the world, and feminist 
politics can take up the politics of injury by understanding that these experiences of injury are 
not specific or limited to women, and therefor injury and sexual subordination are not ​the 
defining factors ​of being a woman, even if many women experience them. 
 
Cultural Feminism  
21 
Gwen Frost 
Subordination and biology are not the only ways feminist thinkers have attempted to 
define ‘women.’ I borrow the term “cultural feminism” from Linda Alcoff’s work “​Cultural 
Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory.” Cultural feminism 
is another mode of gender essentialism, which​ defines ‘woman’ by reclaiming (from men) 
women’s right to define themselves. Within cultural feminism, there has been an effort to define 
‘feminine’ virtues as correctly attributed to women, but wrongfully denigrated to be useless or 
weak virtues. Alcoff discusses cultural feminists such as Adrienne Rich, who rejects biological 
reductionism, yet insists on a “female consciousness” which she grounds in biological factors 
like body parts and menstruation. Thus, women are not reduced to their physical and bodily level 
as totalizing explanation of who women are, which would be a reductionist claim. The female 
essences described by Rich are both experiential and biological, but ​the experiential cannot exist 
without the biological in these theoretical frameworks​. The female consciousness relies on an 
understanding of women’s body as cisgender, reproductive, and able-bodied. 
Promoting a conception of an innate female essence serves to preserve how women have 
been formed due to conditions of patriarchal domination, thus preserving the effects of 
domination, and deeming these effects “innate” to women. To the extent a concrete feminine 
essence “reinforces essentialist explanations” of the attributes of nurturing, peacefulness, and 
caregiving to women, these theories are “in danger of solidifying an important bulwark for sexist 
oppression: the belief in an innate ‘womanhood’ to which we must all adhere lest we be deemed 
either inferior or not ‘true’ women,” (Alcoff 1988, p. 414). This discourse is trans-exclusionary, 
impractically universalized, and deeply steeped in reproductive essentialism. Alcoff summarizes 
cultural feminisms as being grounded in, and creating, an “essentialist response to misogyny and 
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sexism through adopting a homogeneous, unproblematized, and ahistorical conception of 
woman,” (Alcoff 1988, p. 413.) We must also grapple with the oppressive conditions that 
produce seemingly ‘innate’ traits among some women, conditions such as “forced parenting, lack 
of physical autonomy, dependency for survival on mediation,” (Alcoff 1988, p. 414). Claiming 
traits of nurturing and caregiving as innate to women further justifies the gendered division of 
labor that categorizes women as naturally dispositioned for childcare, emotional labor, and 
peace-keeping. Cultural feminist politics attempt to destigmatize historically associated feminine 
characteristics, but they advocate for the reclamation of these characteristics by claiming them 
essential to women’s nature, rather than grappling with how these behaviors are illicited, 
enforced, and assumed in women. This descriptive account of the essence of ‘woman’ is an 
incoherent and inaccurate ground for feminist consciousness to build off.  
Instead of deploying a descriptive account of women’s subjectivity, I argue for a feminist 
politics that deploys a deconstructive account of women’s subjectivity. Alcoff’s intervention of 
cultural feminism is that this theory problematically essentializes the effects of patriarchy as 
inherent to women. In studying how patriarchy affects feminized bodies, both cultural and 
experiential essentialism have problematically limited their subjects to the category of ‘women.’ 
I protest against a feminist politics of identity, insofar as ‘identity’ is assumed to be the 
connective tissue of the feminist movement. I hope to employ a deconstructive method that 
de-essentializes the effects of patriarchy from the subject of ‘women,’ but still maintains an 
analysis for how these effects become integrated into sociocultural schemas of gender difference. 
 
The Deconstructive Approach of Post-structural Feminism 
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The post-structural intervention in feminist theory is to define women as entirely socially 
constructed, that there are no inherent or essential traits of gender. ‘Woman’ is produced as a 
sexed object, a cultural construct, and as a set of ideals to be performed. One of the most 
prominent thinkers in post-structural feminism is Judith Butler, who in ​Gender Trouble ​describes 
that discursive terrain that constructs the category of “woman.” Butler points to the discursive 
structure of gender as a force that “produces reality-effects that are eventually misperceived as 
'facts'" (Butler 1992, p. 115). Butler uses de Beauvoir’s claim that “one is not born, but rather 
becomes ​a woman” to suggest that “woman itself is a term in process, a becoming, a constructing 
that cannot rightfully be said to originate or end,” (Butler 1992, p. 45). For Butler, gender has no 
telos​ of embodiment, but is established and performed through “regulatory practices” that 
produce binary categories of sex and gender (Butler 1992, p. 44).  
For Butler, ‘gender’ has no essential characteristics, nor does the word ‘woman,’ 
accurately encapsulate any one group of individuals. To the degree that gender is ‘real,’ this 
conception of ‘realness’ is sustained on maintaining a ‘knowable’ world, a ‘nameable’ world, a 
taxonomic organization of individuals based on shared characteristics, capabilities, and behavior. 
Natalie Stoljar’s analysis of transgender character Venus Xtravaganza in ​Paris is Burning ​reveals 
how subjects like Xtravaganza exemplify “people of indeterminate biological sex to whom the 
common-sense concept of woman clearly applies due to their behaviors, clothes, make- up, 
sexuality, hair, body shape, etc,“ (Stoljar 1995, p. 273). This argument denaturalizes sex from 
gender and de-essentializes the category of ‘women’ as ‘people with female bodies.’ Thus, the 
oppression of feminized subjects does not circulate in a way that touches only female bodies, but 
also bodies that represent and replicate a concept of ‘womanness,’ of pertaining to and 
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identifying with women as an idealized concept, thus denoting participation and existence within 
the social-class of ‘women.’  
The irresolute and fluctuating embodiment of an idealized, normative ‘realness’ is the 
grid by which individuals assess their own (and others’) existence, or ‘realness.’ ‘Realness’ 
comes with a burden of proof, of performing and embodying an identity that may or may not 
maximize one’s ability to survive and/or thrive in a world where power (access and/or control of 
resources) is often distributed among racial, gender and class-based groups.  Realness does not 
solely appear on the surface of our bodies, nor the configurement of our bodies; ‘realness’ is 
created in the perceptions that others have of us, and the relativity of our identity to others in 
approximate locations.  
This argument is anti-essentialist in its acknowledgement of the malleability and 
temporality of gender; at times, and in certain spaces, the body becomes aware of its gendered 
dimensions. The awareness of one’s gender and the sociocultural consequences that come with it 
need not be restricted to such temporality; the effects of gender oppression on the individual are 
not contingent upon being either “in and out of the eye of ‘the social,’” (Riley 2003, p. 103). A 
body resisting the ultimate definitive state of “woman” is not a condition for avoiding being 
treated​ or ​perceived​ as a woman in a totalizing manner. The social categorization of gender is 
temporal and transitory, but the subjection and ‘other’-ing of some bodies and not others can be 
analyzed through historical patterns of queer, female, and gender non-conforming peoples 
inhabiting bodies that are perceived as feminine, and ​thus are sites for patriarchal subordination​.  
Denise Riley argues that the body is not “an originating point nor yet a terminus; it is a 
result or an effect,” (Riley 2003, p. 102). Like Butler, gender has no ​telos​ for Riley. ​Temporality 
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is the most important notion that arises from Riley’s chapter “Bodies, Identities, Feminisms,” a 
temporality of the sexed and gendered body. She opens the method “of tracing the (always 
anatomically gendered) body as it is differently established and interpreted as sexed within 
different periods,” (Riley 2003, p. 103). The body only sometimes poses its question in terms of 
gender, and gendered divisions do not in sum define one’s bodily life. Are there some places 
gender cannot go? Even liberated from the binary, on a spectrum of gender identifications, does 
gender always occur if it is so constructed? Are there moments of genderless existence, and what 
are the circumstances? To view the female body as perennially defined, as “constant and even 
embodiments of sexed being,” is to oversimplify the individual’s capacity to move in and out of 
the social ​and individual​ experience of gender. Clearly gender occurs onto us differently in the 
presence of others, and it occurs onto us in different ways around different persons. To be made 
aware of one’s gender, to be talked to, looked at, or treated ​as ​a woman, this register of 
awareness is always approaching, receding, and slipping in and out of sight from the individual’s 
eye, just as gender moves in and out of the social eye. Being a ‘woman’ is formed externally 
within the social or cultural landscapes that one may enter, and pressed onto the bodies of 
‘women’ who are categorized as such. In reference to my discussion of “passing” as a woman, 
this is the ability to “pass” as an idealized construct of a woman. Passing tends to reward women 
who embody femininity most closely to the idealized requirements of docility, utility, and 
beauty, but these embodiments are temporally located in both their ​expression​ of femininity, and 
their ​recognition as femininity​, both of which fluctuate temporally, and locationally. The internal 
experience of being a gender is hardly internal, but is instead a marker of how individuals are 
interpreted ​by themselves and by others,​ both socially and politically.  
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While Riley and Butler both emphasize non-essentialist arguments for what “woman” is, 
neither seems to offer what irreplaceable benefits exist from the identity category of “woman;” 
Specifically, neither seriously acknowledge that there is an absolute reason to retain a group 
consciousness of ‘women.’ Many thinkers have argued (such as Linda Alcoff and Susan Bordo) 
that the category of “woman” ​does​ have unwavering benefits, and theories that seek to dispose of 
the category often offer few concrete suggestions for non-essentialist feminist politics outside the 
academy. For my argument, I acknowledge that ‘woman’ has played an important role in 
building consciousness to resist oppression, but that group-consciousness based solely on a claim 
to identity, or a designation to identity, does not give ‘grounding’ to the political movement of 
feminism. This appeared ‘grounding’ is linguistic, and professes that the sameness of identity 
characteristics connotes a sameness of politics or strife, a grounding that limits feminism from 
exploring structures of domination outside of patriarchy, and subjects outside of women. 
 
Part III 
Connective Tissues of Emotion, Women, and Feminism  
What if feminist politics could be grounded in the connective tissue of emotions that 
shape the lives of oppressed peoples, instead of grounded in the assumed, homogeonous subject 
of ‘women’? Emotions of pain have historically been vital to describing women’s experiences, as 
“women’s experiences of violence, injury and discrimination have been crucial to feminist 
politics,” (Ahmed 2015, p. 172). A painful emotion, such as shame, is not a material 
consequence of gender, but can be read as an emotion often signifying an individual's relative 
closeness to physically embodying normative ideals of their “gender.” Tamara Ferguson and 
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Heidi Lee Dempsey discuss the role that gender plays in an individual's likelihood to feel shame 
and guilt in social contexts, with findings that suggest one of the conditions of being a ‘woman’ 
is feeling shame, a deeply physical and psychological affect (​Ferguson & Dempsey, 2000)​. 
Could a base that unites women in a joint revolution​ also be a base that is shared ​by individuals 
who are not women? Rephrased, widespread experience and commonality may be shared 
between groups without losing their revolutionary potency in advocating for alleviation of how 
social pressure affects ​a certain​ community of individuals.  
Moving from shame to fear in understanding connective tissues of feminism offers 
another vantage point for feminist politics. Sara Ahmed discusses how “feelings of fear and 
vulnerability hence shape women’s bodies” by authorized narratives of “who should be afraid is 
bound up with the politics of mobility, whereby the mobility of some bodies involves or even 
requires the restriction of the mobility of others,” (Ahmed 2015, p. 70). Taking Stoljar’s second 
point from her cluster concept of woman, varying qualifications and characteristics of ‘women’ 
gather in a cluster, touching the bodies of women, and touching the bodies of feminized, 
subordinated, and/or sexualized bodies. Social factors like fear are also seen as a connective 
tissue of women’s experience, in that fear of being in the pubic world means one is susceptible to 
“shrinkage,” away from spaces marked as ‘unsafe’ for women, like being out at night, walking 
alone, and being in places like bars and nightclubs where drugging and sexual violence have 
become normalized to such an extent that the onus is put on women to prevent their own 
experience of violence by simply removing themselves, or avoiding ‘reckless’ behavior (like 
wearing something revealing, or drinking). If fear sticks to some bodies because of social 
narratives of who should be scared, we can apply this emotional process to our study of the 
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proxemics ​of public space; to analyze how public space organized and maintained as a place 
where certain people should be scared for their life or well-being. Fear sticks to bodies that suffer 
systemic violence; black men are murdered by police in public space, trans people are attacked 
or murdered in public space, houseless people are so dehumanized that violence onto them in a 
public space is seen as consequential of their existence. A feminist politics could address and 
bring attention to how fear circulates, and who it sticks to. Some bodies are marked as ​objects​ of 
fear, where existing in public space is dangerous because they are perceived as a threat. 
Moving from fear to vulnerability, some bodies and representations are seen and treated 
as more vulnerable to violence than others. Sara Ahmed says that “vulnerability is not an 
inherent characteristic of women’s bodies; rather, it is an effect that works to secure femininity 
as a delimitation of movement in the public, and over-inhabitance in the private,” (Ahmed 2015, 
p. 70). The emotion of feeling vulnerable has to do with a certain expectation of violence. Seeing 
others as vulnerable does the work of underestimating their capacity to defend themselves, and 
also as seeing them as obvious receptacles for violence. In attaching to subjects such as women 
and children, the emotion of vulnerability does the work of justifying necessary external 
protection, which allows external forces (the State, men, parents) to deny rights based on 
assuming control of the vulnerable subject’s protection. A feminist politics that analyzes how 
some bodies get marked as vulnerable, despite the realistic probability that violence won’t occur, 
and how some bodies get marked as objects of fear, despite the realist probability that violence is 
likely to occur ​onto them​, this politics could better attend to the emotions that hold so many of 
our political ideals, prejudices, and stereotypes in place, despite evidence to the contrary. 
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Experiences of shame, hyper-sexualization, sexual subordination, abuse, and silencing 
could be seen as the affects of women, (not women alone, but of women nonetheless.) The 
argument that these emotions and affects circulate and stick to some bodies, and not others, 
would provide a comprehensive reading of how identities are constructed and played into on a 
deeply emotional level. Conceiving of the subjectivity of women could involve a deep analysis 
of the "complex of habits resulting from the semiotic interaction of 'outer world' and 'inner 
world,' the continuous engagement of a self or subject in social reality,” (de Lauretis 1995, p. 
182). This interaction between the subject and social reality is​ semiotic​, as de Lauretis points out, 
involving charged signs and symbols of identification which both produce the subject, and 
produce social reality. To investigate the cluster concept of ‘women’ would also involve 
interrogating how ​signs, objects, and symbols come to be gendered​, and come to ​signify​ gender. 
The web of woman is not made up of obstacles and hindrances alone. The joy of 
solidarity of people who have suffered ​not as you have suffered​, but who have suffered 
nonetheless; not someones who feels your pain, but bears witness and comradery to your pain. In 
The Cultural Politics of Emotion​, Sara Ahmed discusses the impossibility of an empathy that 
would profess ‘I feel your pain!’ The very impossibility of this empathy, how some pains are 
impossible to grasp but it is because of this impossibility that we must subject ourselves to “a 
different kind of inhabitance,” (Ahmed 2015, p. 39). Ahmed professes an “ethics of responding 
to pain,” of “being open to being affected by that which one cannot know or feel,” (Ahmed 2015, 
p. 32). To recognize and discover that which “refuses to keep us apart, but also does not bring us 
together,” (Ahmed 2015, p. 39). A collective politics must find an ethics of responding to pain, 
or this professed solidarity will be empty. There is also the joy, that comes from a chorus of 
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desires for a different world, the community and comradery that comes from all the darkness of 
oppression. For women who give birth to their first child, for men who give birth to their first 
child, the joys of carrying a child, the joys of raising a child, the joys of never, ever having a 
child, all the joys of womanhood, of personhood. The joys of what has been considered ‘woman’ 
seep out from the depalidated borders of the category of women, to touch all who wish it, and to 
require no membership within its boundaries, because these boundaries are in flux, moving, 
shifting, over different bodies in different contexts. 
Opening the Category of Women  
Post-structuralist thought has been utilized by many feminist theorists to advocate that 
“feminist efforts must be directed toward dismantling this fiction (of ‘woman’),” (Alcoff 1988, p. 
417). While identifying with patriarchal conceptions of ‘women’ is theorized by Brown and 
Riley to resubordinate women, the history of the present must be considered in order to 
understand the parameters of a launch point of women’s future in the world. Ridding the 
category of ‘women’ of it’s patriarchal configurements would have to fundamentally challenge 
the naturalized understandings of who women are, as they have almost always been defined in 
relation to men. If the conception of ‘women’ is so often resignified, it seems both important and 
perilous to invoke Julia Kristeva’s analysis of the modern European feminism invocation of 
‘women’, which “is itself a temporary form which must wither away,” (Riley 2003, p. 109). 
What is specifically important about Kristeva’s analysis is the ​temporality ​of of any claim to 
woman, where resignification of gender identity must constantly be propelling towards the future 
imagined, the future desired, rather than configured in relation and limited to oppressive 
structures of the past and the present. To allow ‘women’ to be free from essentialist definitions is 
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“to open up a term, like the subject, to a reusage or redeployment that previously has not been 
authorized,” (Butler 1992, p. 15).  
Natalie Stoljar invokes nominalism to construct a cluster concept of ‘women’: “‘Woman’ 
could be the name of a class of similar particulars without implying that womanness constitutes a 
natural universal,” (Stoljar 1995, p. 276). If we accept that ‘women’ are socially constructed, 
“then the 'essence* of woman... is a nominal one. It is a totality of qualities, properties and 
attributes that such feminists define, envisage, or enact for themselves,” (de Lauretis 2003, p. 3). 
Stoljar smartly nominates woman as a “cluster-concept,” organizing individuals based on real 
similarities among the real and social type of ‘woman.’ She outlines for general elements of the 
cluster-concept of ‘women’: 
The first element she discusses is womanness as “attributed on the basis of female sex,” 
such as chromosomal makeup or “bodily characteristics such as gait or voice quality.” Secondly, 
the phenomenological features of being a woman which includes both experiences produced both 
by social factors, “like fear of walking on the streets at night or fear of rape,” and physical 
factors, like menstrual pain or feminine sexuality. Her third element describes the culturally 
produced and embodied roles that women experience, ranging from the responsibilities women 
are saddled with (like child-rearing or making oneself small), to women’s oppression under 
normative expressions of femininity (how women are propositioned to dress, act, and move.) Her 
fourth element is both self-identification and how we are perceived by others; “calling oneself a 
woman and being called a woman,” (Stoljar 1995, p. 283-284). 
What “counts” as being a woman is controversial, but if we understand these elements as 
not wholly constitutive of every woman, but rather as markers of similarity ​among​ women, the 
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exclusionary nature of a homogenized form that women can take is avoided. Her first element 
includes female sex which might automatically be read as trans-exclusionary, but she explains 
that “female sex is centrally important to the notion of woman and how individuals can be 
women without being of the female sex,” (Stoljar 1995, p. 285). Within her projection of 
‘women’ as a resemblance class, “people are women when they have enough of the properties 
relevant in the application of the concept,” (Stoljar 1995, p. 288). While this idea is freshly 
tangible in its discussion of what a pragmatic feminist politics could look like for women, would 
being an individual who satisfies all four elements make them ​more of a woman​ than someone 
who identifies with only one or two elements? Emphasizing that there is a degree to which one is 
a woman is not a problematic concept in itself, because there are various degrees to which we all 
embody our personal identities (for example, someone who is white-passing but identifies as a 
person of color due to their lineage and experiences.) It should follow that satisfying all four 
elements within the cluster-group of ‘women’ does not necessarily mean the maximization of 
patriarchal oppression, because their are privileges attached to embodying perfectly the 
conception of the idealized ‘woman’ (being cisgender, with reproductive capacities, and visually 
discernible as a woman). It should also follow that any qualifying elements within the cluster of 
women’s identification are always shifting and open to re-signification, to adding elements, 
subtracting them, a politics of contestation. 
Though there is no single, unifying, socio-physical experience of gender, or of race, or of 
class, there is a web of material and nonmaterial conditions, woven through a plurality of hands 
and experiences. By ‘material conditions’ I do not mean internal or essential conditions that 
make someone a woman, but rather the materiality that configures and imposes itself upon this 
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subject disposition. A web of woman can be imagined as the material, emotional, and social 
obstacles and hindrances being the strings of “woman” that immobilize individuals, all captured 
within their infinite specificity of located​ness​. The materiality of tucking underwear for some 
trans women, the materiality of chest binders for some trans men who have possibility had past 
experience as a woman, the materiality of menstruation, of menopause, of never getting a period, 
but the physical pain of wanting one so that you can be like other girls, the emotional discourse 
that imbeds all women deeply in both shame and pleasure of the material and emotional life of 
gender. 
The normative foundations of identity categories are constantly being resignified in 
accordance to always-shifting relevant sociocultural norms, and thus attention to the specificity 
of factionalizations has been, and could be, a truly emancipatory task of feminist discourse and 
theorizing. Contestations of circulating definitions of ‘women’ don’t have to be conflict-oriented 
factionalizations, but could be a way to deconstruct terms of identity and unwed them from an 
assumed experience, to “continue to use (these terms), to repeat them, to repeat them 
subversively, and to displace them from the contexts in which they have been deployed as 
instruments of oppressive power,” (Brown 1992, p. 17). To continue to use these terms in new, 
generative ways, to include emotions as markers for how people are subjected, to use how people 
interact with space and location, to define ‘who’ women are by ‘what we want,’ which is always 
shaped by what we have, and the conditions in the present (Brown 1995, p. 75). 
A politics of feminism does not need to abandon the subject of women, but a politics of 
feminism cannot be grounded in women, and the women that feminist politics speak for cannot 
be taken for granted as essential, inherent, or fixed. If gender categories are theorized to be 
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essential or beyond negation, these concepts it will be challenged. The concept of ‘woman’ will 
continue to evolve, reorganize, and deconstruct itself, as will all human-defined categorizations. 
Constantly resignifying “women” as a normative identity will also lead to a continuous 
evaluation of how women interact with the world, and the world interacts with women, or one’s 
womanness. I too believe that “the rifts among women over the content of the term ought to be 
safeguarded and prized, indeed, that this constant rifting ought to be affirmed as the ungrounded 
ground of feminist theory,” (Butler 1992, 16). However, this “constant rifting” of the term 
‘woman’ should not be the ​only ​ground from which feminist theory bases its politics, though it 
should be​ a​ ground. Moving to decentralize the subject of ‘women’ as feminism’s primary 
subject is a step towards expanding it’s analysis to subjects not located within the gender binary, 
and also a step towards a feminist politics that is capable of recognizing the intersections of 
privilege and powerlessness within identities. 
Decentralizing the Subject of ‘Women’ as the Primary Subject of Feminism 
A feminist politics that demonizes men as the enemy and patriarchy as the sole source of 
women’s oppression relies on a “reductive dichotomy between men and women” that refuses 
intersectionality in it’s insistence on investing in a political consciousness which “has been built 
around simple dichotomies such as powerful/powerless; oppressor/victim,” (Cohen 1997, p. 452, 
480). For example, “Kill All Men,” is a presumably feminist slogan, which spread from the art 
world to the internet, one denoting the fantasy of a violent overthrow of patriarchy. The slogan 
emphasises gender as the target and source of oppression, but fails to acknowledge that the 
speaker of a slogan must rely on a dichotomy of power which precludes any intersectional 
understanding of identities. Popular twitter account “@gringatears” who runs the podcast “Bitter 
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Brown Femmes” stated in one tweet: “I’m not okay with White feminists and their ‘kill all men’ 
flower Tumblr gifs aesthetic. Your whiteness has/does kill men. Non-White men.” This tweet 
emblemized how white women feel incapable of being an oppressor simply because of their 
oppressed status within patriarchy. “White feminism” has become colloquially acknowledged to 
express when a theory or person fails to address the intersections of racial identity and 
experience. A feminism that demonizes all men “discounts the relationships- especially those 
based on shared experiences of marginalization-” that exist between men and women, 
“particularly in communities of color,” (Cohen 1997, p. 450). 
Feminism should not be delimited to women as its subject, because women’s liberation is 
intrinsically tied to issues that encompass more than just women. Liberation from systemic or 
supremasist racism will encur the liberation of women, and others who are immobilized by racial 
discrimination. Liberation from the straight state, the heteronormativity that constricts sexual 
identities, another occurence of women’s liberation. Class oppression and the emotional, 
material, immobilizing harms of capitalism, this is about women. Deconstructing and fighting 
what the gender binary tells us to be, who patriarchy tells us women ​are​, this is a fight for 
anyone cognizant enough to recognize that​ these systems of power all benefit from and 
reproduce eachother. ​As subjects shift, politics shift as well, and our theorizing needs to keep 
up. Resistance to patriarchal oppression will be best enacted when actual connective tissues of 
subordinated femininity are elucidated, and when these tissues can be understood as always in 
movement, touching bodies perceived as women, touching bodies that are seen as less than 
human, touching bodies that are subordinated in historical power dynamics. It is when “feminism 
is no longer directed towards a critique of patriarchy, or secured by the categories of ‘women’ or 
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‘gender’, that is it is doing the most ‘moving’ work,” (Ahmed 2015, p. 176). By ‘moving’, 
Ahmed is talking about the loss of an object, the loss restriction to only one subject, that could 
enable feminism’s energy to “open up possibilities of action that are not constrained by what we 
are against in the present,” (Ahmed 2015, p. 176). Losing the subject of women as a ‘ground’ for 
feminism “opens up possibilities of action that are not constrained by” how we are​ defined ​in the 
present. With the loss of a fixed and assumed subject of ‘women,’ possibilities of feminist 
politics bubble over into resisting the subordination of the Earth, advocating for creatures 
organized in a hierarchy of value ​as less valuable ​than humans, and supporting marginalized 
sexualities deemed irregular and inconsistent within a heteronormative gender binary. Feminism 
should resist and speak out against the subordination of oppressed subjects by contesting the very 
terms of such oppression. Feminism should be contesting that there are physical and emotional 
traits that make someone’s life less valuable than someone else's.  
If there is no universal solution, or no universal problem, there is no universal subject, no 
universal theory. Feminism should proceed with acknowledging the reality of a political system 
built on categorizations, but feminism should ​profess​ a world-system of contingent, 
deconstructed realities of fluidity and criticism. Feminism can avoid determining a universal 
conception of who ‘women’ are by relinquishing the ability to define women by one thing, one 
experience, or one interpretation. There should always be a voice saying “No, that’s not it,” thus, 
I agree in part with Julia Kristeva, because the process by which we define ‘woman’ must be 
constantly negated, and "a feminist practice can only be negative, at odds with what already 
exists so that we may say 'that's not it' and 'that's still not it,” (Kristeva 1981, p. 137). An 
embodied and stable notion of who and what women ​are​ is not necessary in order to have a 
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feminist praxis that invokes more than a discourse of constant negation (“that’s not it”). To 
deconstruct the subject is to free oneself from the connotations and prejudices one’s subjecthood 
carries, and to de-essentialize but keep in understanding the historical transfigurations that mark 
all of our bodies. 
Poststructural thinkers like Julia Kristeva promote a feminist politics that refuses to 
articulate the subject of ‘woman’ as a category worth claiming for feminist politics. "A woman 
cannot be; it is something which does not even belong in the order of being. It follows that a 
feminist practice can only be negative, at odds with what already exists….” (Kristeva 1981, p. 
137). Within much of post-structural feminism, women cannot be liberated from patriarchal 
domination unless they subvert all association and identification ​as ​women. The difficulty in 
finding the language to describe and discuss poststructural feminism is actually indicative of a 
strength​ of poststructural-feminism. Is our inability to write about women beyond their historical 
construction a promising subversion of women’s subordination? Or would we be losing the 
words from our mouths about discrimination we know to be true to our feminine bodies or 
feminized subjectivities? Our discourse is limited from imagining possibilities for ourselves 
outside of the constructions of our own subjectivity. Our words, our stories of the world, and the 
propagations of stereotypes, these all inform our ability to understand ourselves, and each other. 
If “woman” could be so thoroughly disrupted by infinite and distinct embodiments and 
expressions, then would gender discrimination be revealed as only a coincidental, would gender 
discrimination continue to be talked about at all? How would we talk about it? 
Feminist Consciousness: A Turn to Movements Over Identity 
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The contestation of the category of ‘women’ is an absolutely necessary discussion for 
feminist politics. In discussing what ​could​ serve to ground feminist politics, we should turn not 
towards grounding our politics in a definitive subject, but rather in a stratified resistance to all 
forms of subordination. If any and all universal traits of women are problematically racialized, 
classist, and heteronormative, is there a salvageable category of ‘women’ to carry with us into 
future theorizing if we are also fighting for stripping feminism of it’s white supremacy, 
heteronormativity, and feminism’s negligence of how women’s experiences vary across 
socioeconomic position and cultural location? It seems that “in many contexts, 'women' are too 
heterogeneous to be treated as a unitary group,” (Hunter 1996, p. 156). The task of mitigating our 
discourse to avoid totalizing any theory is a positive trajectory for intersectional feminism. 
Perhaps there should be no ‘feminism,’ only ​feminisms​, a network of alliances to alleviate 
subordination that occurs through various apparatuses on our gendered and sexed beings.  
I argue that investing in a feminist consciousness is different than investing in a 
consciousness of women, and retaining an investment in consciousness based around shared 
ideals and grievances is a better investment for feminist politics than a women’s consciousness, 
which only goes as far to assert commonality around identity. A feminist consciousness would 
offer a practice of understanding the tethered fates of all oppressed peoples, and the tethered pain 
of oppressed peoples, which through speaking of our pain and listening to others pain can be a 
“condition for the formation of a ‘we’, made up of different stories of pain that cannot be 
reduced to a ground, identity, or a sameness,” (Ahmed 2015, p. 174).  
What would a politics not invested in a fixed subject look like? In “Punks, Bulldaggers, 
and Welfare Queens,” Cathy J. Cohen asks us to consider “a politics where one’s relation to 
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power, and not some homogenized identity, is privileged in determining one’s political 
comrades,” (Cohen 1997, p. 438). The potential for transformative coalition work is inhibited by 
“political practices structured around binary conceptions of sexuality and power,” or binary 
conceptions of gender and power, as we’ve seen in my example of white feminism, where all 
women are imagined to be oppressed, and all men are imagined to be oppressive, discounting 
and disregarding the varying levels of privilege that are experienced by members of both groups 
due to racial identity, class-status, and sexual orientation (Cohen 1997, p. 441). Cohen elucidates 
that a problem with queer politics is that the reproduction of a dichotomy of power 
(heterosexuals/all queers) reduces and “collapses our understanding of power into a single 
continuum of evaluation,” (Cohen 1997, p. 452). The dichotomous approaches to power that 
“consistently activate only one characteristic of their identity… to organize their politics” 
actually reject “any recognition of the multiple and intersecting systems of power that largely 
dictate our life chances,” (Cohen 1997, p. 440). Cohen argues that black and latinx women 
welfare recipients face systemic oppression due to the always racialized, gendered, and 
capitalistic institution of heteronormativity. Cohen makes this argument not to argue that the 
experiences of varying queer peoples should be conflated or assumed synonymous to other 
groups that suffer due to heterosexual domination, but rather to profess a queer politics that is 
“inclusive of all those who stand outside of the dominant constructured norm of state-sanctioned 
white middle- and upper-class heterosexuality,” (Cohen 1997, p. 441). By acknowledging the 
contingent oppressions of welfare recipients and queer people, political coalitions can be formed 
by grappling with heteronormativy’s expansive power, a power that is inextricably embedded 
and reproduced in white supremacy, patriarchy, and class-based oppression. Though the same 
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oppressive power structure may be elucidated as a common enemy, it is important to emphasize 
that these oppressions are experienced in different ways, and have different effects, on differing 
subjects. It is not a professed ‘sameness’ of experience that grounds coalitional politics, but 
rather a deep understanding of how the intersectionality of identity can link movements of 
marginalized peoples. I argue for a feminist solidarity like Cohens, that moves across and among 
identities, grounded in “our shared marginal relationship to dominant power which normalizes, 
legitimizes, and privileges,” (Cohen 1997, p. 458). This connective tissue requires an 
intersectional analysis of how power functions on different bodies and in different regions, 
creating a politics that acknowledges the tethered fates of people across and within identities. 
This also requires acknowledging the privileges marginalized people hold ​within​ marginalized 
communities; for example, a queer person with white privilege experiences the violence of 
heteronormativity differently than a queer latinx person, and attention to these differences 
requires not only a comprehensive analysis of the different ways heteronormativity functions, but 
also grappling with how white normativity organizes and oppresses different bodies in 
conjunction with, and isolation from, the heteronormative power that marks both bodies. 
 The connectivity between persons on the basis of what is deprived does not necessarily 
need a subject, but it requires people who share this need, and people who profess solidarity and 
support ​despite their differences in identity or experience​. Feminism must lose the category of 
women as it’s only subject, as a subject defined in a fixed manner, and the characteristics of 
women must be constantly defined, and redefined, for as long as subjectivity is constantly being 
redefined by the peoples under it’s guise, we, as feminists, can perpetuate and assert a culture of 
offering our best possible truths, and never rendering them complete or entirely holistic.  
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Feminist politics doesn’t require a negative politics despite my arguments that the 
category of ‘women’ should always be contested ; reactivity alone does not need to guide or 
restrict the possibilities for how oppressed peoples resist or articulate better futures. In some 
ways, all of humanity that lives today is confined in some way confined or burdened by 
ideologies which rely upon the subordination of characteristics that we would ​all​ serve to 
reconsider; animalism, weakness, vulnerability, lack of desire to master the earth, etc. A world 
where ‘woman’ no longer ​means​ being subordinated can be imagined by not just naive iterations 
that don’t reflect reality, but think beyond the names we have been born into. If we proctor 
understanding the role of our own identities in our own experience, this knowledge cannot avoid 
inseminating the ideals we hold about others. The revolution will be self-reflective. W​e may very 
well begin to understand the practice of being, and articulate for ourselves a future that is not 
constricted to how we are perceived and located within categories of identification. ​People who 
identify as ‘women’ can resist subordination by critically engaging the alliances and 
commonalities shared by those subordinated. To comprehend a theory of universalize 
domination, to varying degrees and extents and experiences. Feminism would be suited to 
comprehend a theory of universalize domination, to varying degrees and extents and experiences, 
in order to examine the connective fibers that makes feminism necessary for the world. 
One example of a generative, unexplored “connective tissue” in feminist politics (neither 
theory nor praxis) is between Donald Trump’s rhetoric of “Energy Dominance,” used in both 
legislation and as an expressed position of the U.S. “Energy Dominant” is the stance of the  U.S. 
in terms of ceasing to drill or frack oil; the U.S. is not cutting back, repurposing, or 
reconceptualizing energy, Trump says; the U.S. is ​energy dominant. ​Trump is deploying a 
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masculinist conception of subordination onto a submissive “other.” This “submissiveness” is 
gained through subordination, force, or an unwillingness to negotiate. People who engage in the 
embodied resistance of Trump’s violent immigration policies and rhetoric are also positioned 
against his legislation of masculinist conceptions of a forcefully subordinated “other.” Could 
resistance to these violences ever solely be attributed to powers of patriarchy, or of white 
supremacy, or of heterosexism, of class-based oppression? Is this resistance solely the task of 
women, of people of color, of queer people, or of the lower socioeconomic class? I argue this 
resistance between two stratas of embodied identity is a ​connective tissue​. Feminist ​theory​ taking 
up more coalitional politics is a feminism attentive to connective tissues. The analysis of patterns 
in how different identities and different bodies are marked with and by emotions is a fruitful 
connective tissue, one to be explored across geographic and social locations. To explore the 
connective tissue of emotions within culturally assigned identities could produce articulations of 
tethered struggles, movements, and passions. Feminist ​practice ​gaining momentum in taking up 




Feminist politics is having an identity crisis, and so am I. Gender fluidity is not the first 
cultural phenomenon to bring up a cacophony of criticisms about mainstream feminism’s limited 
scope, subject, and content. By examining how canonical feminist thinkers have attempted to 
ground feminist politics in a defined category of women, I have sought to show how feminism 
has problematically promoted gender essentialism in a way that constricts the politics of 
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feminism by recreating the discourse of women as naturally or essentially subordinated by male 
domination. Limiting feminism’s project to only be attentive to the connective tissue ​between 
women​ doesn’t go far enough to unpack how this tissue connects people outside of the category 
of ‘women.’ When feminism fails to have an intersectional analysis of power and subjectivity, it 
also fails to have any relevant truths to offer the question of how power functions outside of the 
dichotomy of power where ‘men’ are the oppressors, and ‘women’ are the oppressed. This kind 
of analysis could only occur in a vacuum. 
Gender fluidity is not a problem for feminism, but rather an opportunity for feminism, to 
establish connective tissues of experience, emotion, and political ideals in order to mobilize 
solidarity, instead of relying on a fixed category of identification to denote its politics. 
Decentralizing the subject of ‘women’ is important for feminism not just in wake of gender 
fluidities rising popularity, but also in recognizing that a politics that is only attentive to the 
gendered being of ‘woman’ cannot account for the complex interrelations of patriarchy, white 
supremacy, class-based oppression, and other institutional powers of domination. Awareness of 
our tethered oppressions is the first step of building a collective consciousness that can no longer 
see any system of domination as intrinsically separate from any other system of domination.  
Feminist politics should adopt a deconstructive approach when engaging with identity 
categories. A deconstructive approach prompts feminism to make structural accounts of how 
various subjects are produced by power dynamics that seek to essentialize stereotyped 
conceptions of oppressed peoples. A deconstructive approach does not require a rejection and 
demonization of all characteristics culturally associated with women, but it does reject that any 
of these characteristics are innate or essential. Just as there is no one universal attribute of 
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women, there is no one source of women’s oppression. A deconstructive approach requires the 
understanding that we are all constructed and imbricated differently within power relations, but 
that these differences do not necessarily correlate to also having different or incompatible 
political desires. In fact, these differences are a strength of coalitional politics, enabling a richer 
understanding of how emotions circulate and come to mark some bodies and not others, of how 
prejudices that rely on similar justifications come to restrict some bodies, and not others.  
The subject of ‘women’ is a category we have inherited, but it will only be a 
condemnation of our futures ​if we let it define us in all that we are​. I’m not offering a politics of 
identity, but a politics of emotion, like Sara Ahmed, and a politics of deconstruction, like Judith 
Butler, a politics of temporality, like Denise Riley, a politics that moves, is felt, that touches us. 
A chorus of joy, pain, restriction, freedom, and attention to the tethered fates of oppressed 
peoples everywhere. Restricting the primary subject of feminism to ‘women’ limits feminist 
politics from the potential power it could have on the lives of subordinated peoples everywhere. 
If something is a ‘feminist issue,’ it should not be aligned with feminist politics simply because a 
woman is touched by it; it should be aligned with feminist politics if it is not a world that 
feminism wants to invest in, to recreate, or to endorse. If connective tissues can be established, 
integration of individuals into groups should congeal into overlapping and indiscriminate 
groupings that revolve around changing desires, interests, and urgencies, developing constant 
iterations of better worlds, better arguments, better theories.  
My theory of ‘connective tissues’ of emotion as a ground for feminist politics promotes a 
politics of analyzing patterns that arise in comparing how different bodies and identities are 
subordinated, and attending to the complexities of power structures. A feminist consciousness 
45 
Gwen Frost 
that is attentive to the emotional currents sustaining patriarchal domination is likely to find that 
these emotional currents travel through a variety of systems of domination. In my example of 
Abu Ghraib, I discussed how ​the sexualization of inequality and of power dynamics is not 
limited to female bodies or women subjects, but permeates across the bodies of prisoners, queer 
people, and non-white persons who live in white-dominated societies. It is important for feminist 
politics to be attentive to how sexual subordination is weaponized and deployed in pre-existing 
power dynamics, like racial hierarchies, in order to truly resist the concept that sexual 
subordination is a natural affect of the human condition. To contest the terms of such power 
dynamics is also a vital project for feminism, to resist the universal but varied oppression of 
subordinated persons. Attending to how various subject groups experience oppression (such as 
sexual subordination) that feminism has historically designated as ‘women’s issues’ allows these 
issues to be not descriptive or indicative of one’s position as a woman, but rather indicative of 
one’s relationship to the dominant power structures of the world. Opening the subject of 
feminism is the process of building a coalitional feminist politics, a politics that is capable of 
attending to a multiplicity of subjects that share investments in the destruction of oppressive 
power structures. Patriarchy is not a system that only touches the bodies of women- it is also a 
structure that is deeply invested in heteronormativity for the purposes of controlling the 
reproduction of subjects and the organization of families. Political rhetoric around ‘reproduction’ 
being the primary role of female bodied people is also deployed in anti-gay rhetoric that requires 
‘reproduction’ be a signifier of legitimate sexual relationships. The United States government 
has sought to control the reproductive capabilities and practices of Black women in the U.S, 
forcefully promoting eugenics in order to maintain white dominance and white purity in the 
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national population. ‘Reproduction’ is a connective tissue woven through a plurality of identities 
of oppressed peoples who are affected by norms around reproduction that aim to promote 
‘acceptable’ forms of child-rearing based on who is considered to be an ‘unacceptable’ parent. 
This is a way that feminist politics can take up the politics of reproduction as a connective tissue 
that imbricates a multiplicity of people, while refraining to isolate, homegeonize, and hierarchize 
the perspective of ‘women as a whole’ as the subject of the discussion.  
‘Reproduction’ is just one example of how feminist politics can maintain attention to the 
material conditions that pervade the lives of many women, without promoting the the notion 
systems invested in controlling women’s reproduction affect only women, and that the women it 
does affect are all effected in a homogenous way. Feminist politics have relied on being able to 
locate some issues as specific to ‘women,’ and also to locate those ‘women’ as sharing a set of 
identifiable traits. In an age where gender is becoming more fluid, feminist politics need to adapt 
with it. Feminism must relinquish the over-simplified notion of a dichotomous system of power, 
a system that is also invested in maintaining the gender binary as a means of organizing and 
controlling gendered subjects. Feminism must also relinquish the subject of women as its 
exclusive subject of exploration, and turn instead to a politics of inter-related subjects and 
connected experiences of oppression. Opening the category of women to resignification, 
decentralizing ‘women’ from being the primary and assumed subject of feminism, and turning to 
movements of collective politics, connected tissue, and analyses of emotion will ultimately 
reorient contemporary feminist politics to a more inclusive, intersectional, and relevant form of 
politics. Defining ‘women’ has been a political project of feminism since feminism’s origination 
as a movement, and the tradition should continue with a deconstructive aim. The connective 
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tissue of feminist politics no longer has to be the subject of women; rather, it can be an 
amalgamation of contingent oppressions, the affective politics of emotion, the building of 
solidarity across stratas of identity. To mobilize feminist politics we must permit feminism to 
move​, to draw patterns of social experience in an unlimited manner, resulting in a clearer focus 
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